

Quiz with prizes!!



KING'S
College
LONDON

Polynomial Commitments from Lattices

Ngoc Khanh Nguyen

Joint work with: *Valerio Cini, Giulio Malavolta
and Hoeteck Wee*

Outline

1. Notion of a polynomial commitment scheme
2. Prior constructions from lattices
3. Our contributions
4. Performance
5. Quiz!!!

SNARKs



ethereum



SNARKs


- Succinct
- Non-interactive
- ARgument (of)
- Knowledge



ethereum




Interactive Proof



Non-Interactive Proof

$$R(x, w) = 1$$




π



Succinct Non-Interactive Proof


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Succinct: $|\pi| \ll |w|$ + fast verifier

Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge

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


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Knowledge soundness: If a prover can convince the verifier with high probability, then it ``must know w ''.

Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge

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


Succinct: $|\pi| \ll |w|$ + fast verifier

Knowledge soundness: If a prover can convince the verifier with high probability, then it ``must know w ''.

Argument: knowledge soundness holds under a computational assumption.

Applications of polynomial commitments



Polynomial Commitments [KZG10]



$$t = \text{Com}(f; r)$$



Polynomial $f \in R[X]$ of degree $< L$

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It's hard to find two different openings (f, r) and (f', r') such that $\text{Com}(f; r) = \text{Com}(f'; r')$.

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Hiding:

The adversary can't learn any information about (f, r) from t


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
Polynomial $f \in R[X]$ of degree $< L$

$$t = \text{Com}(f; r)$$

$$x \in R$$



$(y, \pi = \text{proof that } f(x) = y \text{ and } t = \text{Com}(f; r))$




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Completeness:

For an honest prover the verifier accepts

Knowledge soundness:

If a prover can convince the verifier with high probability, then it "must know f ".

Zero-knowledge/hiding:

the verifier does not learn anything about f from the interaction

Succinctness:

The proof size and verifier runtime are $\ll L$, i.e. $\text{poly}(\lambda, \log L)$

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Prior works

Functional commitment [LRY16]:
commit to input x . Next, given a
function f , output $y := f(x)$ and prove
that $f(x) = y$.

[ACLMT22]

CRYPTO
2022

[FLV23]

[CLM23]


CRYPTO
2023

[BCFL23]

TCC
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
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Functional commitment [LRY16]:

Provide an **interactive** split-and-fold evaluation proof and make it non-interactive via Fiat-Shamir transform.



Prior works



$\text{polylog}(L)$ $\text{polylog}(L)$



$\text{polylog}(L)$



[WW23]
Knowledge K-R-ISIS

[DFS24]

Quantum attack on
knowledge K-R-ISIS
and more (!)

CRYPTO
2018

[BBCGL18]

$O(\sqrt{L})$

CRYPTO
20-21

[BLNS20]

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sizes

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
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
Functional commitment [L

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verifier

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non-interactive
tree

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2023

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
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


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

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Ajtai commitment [Ajt96]

- Let \mathbb{Z}_q be a ring of integers modulo q .
- To commit to a **short** message vector \mathbf{s} , we compute:

$$\begin{array}{|c|} \hline A \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{|c|} \hline s \\ \hline \end{array} = \begin{array}{|c|} \hline t \\ \hline \end{array} \pmod{q}$$

commitment

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commitment

Binding holds under the Shortest Integer Solution (SIS) problem:

Given a random matrix \mathbf{A} , find a short non-zero vector \mathbf{s} s.t.

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Ajtai commitment [Ajt96]

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← commitment

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Can we build a polynomial commitment from this?

- More structure to \mathbf{A} [CLM23]?
- Preprocessing [BCS23]?



Ajtai commitment for large messages

- Let $G_n = \begin{bmatrix} [1 \ 2 \ 4 \ \dots \ 2^{\log q}] & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & [1 \ 2 \ 4 \ \dots \ 2^{\log q}] \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n \log q}$
- The binary decomposition function $G_n^{-1}: \mathbb{Z}_q^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \log q}$ satisfies for any $\mathbf{f} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$:

$$G_n G_n^{-1}(\mathbf{f}) = \mathbf{f}$$


We will ignore the subscript.

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TLDR; Binary-decompose each entry of the vector

Ajtai commitment for large messages


To commit to any message vector $\mathbf{f} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, we compute:



f


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
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Many-to-one Ajtai commitment

To commit to any message vector $\mathbf{f}_\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ of length $m = \kappa^\ell \cdot n$, we compute:




\mathbf{f}_ℓ

$\kappa^\ell \cdot n$


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
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
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
Mathematically: $(\mathbf{I}_{\kappa^{\ell-1}} \otimes \mathbf{A})\mathbf{s}_{\ell-1} = \mathbf{f}_{\ell-1}$

Finding different short $\mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}, \mathbf{s}'_{\ell-1}$ s.t.
 $(\mathbf{I}_{\kappa^{\ell-1}} \otimes \mathbf{A})\mathbf{s}_{\ell-1} = \mathbf{f}_{\ell-1} = (\mathbf{I}_{\kappa^{\ell-1}} \otimes \mathbf{A})\mathbf{s}'_{\ell-1}$
 Breaking SIS


Our commitment scheme

$$f_\ell$$


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
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
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
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
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
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


Our commitment scheme



Opening to a commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$: message \mathbf{f}_ℓ and short $\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}$ s.t.


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$$(I_{\kappa^1} \otimes A)s_1 = f_1$$

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


Opening to a commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$: message \mathbf{f}_ℓ and short $\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}$ s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} f_2 &:= Gs_1 \\ (I_{\kappa^2} \otimes A)s_2 &= f_2 \end{aligned}$$

$$(I_{\kappa^1} \otimes A)s_1 = f_1$$

Our commitment scheme



Opening to a commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$: message \mathbf{f}_ℓ and short $\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}$ s.t.

$$Gs_{\ell-1} = f_\ell$$

$$f_{\ell-1} := Gs_{\ell-2} \\ (I_{\kappa^{\ell-1}} \otimes A)s_{\ell-1} = f_{\ell-1}$$

$$f_2 := Gs_1 \\ (I_{\kappa^2} \otimes A)s_2 = f_2$$

$$(I_{\kappa^1} \otimes A)s_1 = f_1$$

Why is our scheme interesting

Opening to a commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$: message \mathbf{f}_ℓ and short $\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}$ s.t.

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Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}



valid opening $\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1}, (\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2})$ for the commitment $(\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n) \mathbf{G} \mathbf{s}_1 = (\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n) \mathbf{f}_2$

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$$(\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n)\mathbf{f}_2 = (\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n)(\mathbf{I}_{\kappa^2} \otimes \mathbf{A})\mathbf{s}_2$$

$$= (\mathbf{I}_\kappa \otimes \mathbf{A})(\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_{\kappa n \log q})\mathbf{s}_2$$

$$= (\mathbf{I}_\kappa \otimes \mathbf{A})\mathbf{r}_1$$

Opening to a commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$: message \mathbf{f}_ℓ and short $\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}$ s.t.

$$\mathbf{G}\mathbf{s}_{\ell-1} = \mathbf{f}_\ell$$

$$\mathbf{f}_{\ell-1} := \mathbf{G}\mathbf{s}_{\ell-2}$$

$$(\mathbf{I}_{\kappa^{\ell-1}} \otimes \mathbf{A})\mathbf{s}_{\ell-1} = \mathbf{f}_{\ell-1}$$

$$\mathbf{f}_2 := \mathbf{G}\mathbf{s}_1$$

$$(\mathbf{I}_{\kappa^2} \otimes \mathbf{A})\mathbf{s}_2 = \mathbf{f}_2$$

$$(\mathbf{I}_{\kappa^1} \otimes \mathbf{A})\mathbf{s}_1 = \mathbf{f}_1$$

Why is our scheme interesting

Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}



valid opening $\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1}, (\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2})$ for the commitment $(\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n) \mathbf{G} \mathbf{s}_1 = (\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n) \mathbf{f}_2$

$$\mathbf{r}_1 = (\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_{\kappa n \log q}) \mathbf{s}_2$$

Length: $\kappa^2 n \log q$

$$\mathbf{r}_2 = (\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_{\kappa^2 n \log q}) \mathbf{s}_3$$

Length: $\kappa^3 n \log q$

⋮

$$\mathbf{r}_{\ell-2} = (\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_{\kappa^{\ell-2} n \log q}) \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}$$

Length: $\kappa^{\ell-1} n \log q$

$$\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1} := \mathbf{G} \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2}$$

Opening to a commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$: message \mathbf{f}_ℓ and short $\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}$ s.t.

$$\mathbf{G} \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1} = \mathbf{f}_\ell$$

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$$(\mathbf{I}_{\kappa^1} \otimes \mathbf{A}) \mathbf{s}_1 = \mathbf{f}_1$$

Opening proof

Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}



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Length: $\kappa^{\ell-1} n \log q$

$$\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1} := \mathbf{G} \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2}$$

Proof of opening to the commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$



$\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$



\mathbf{t}

Opening proof

Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}



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Length: $\kappa^3 n \log q$

⋮

$$\mathbf{r}_{\ell-2} = (\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_{\kappa^{\ell-2} n \log q}) \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}$$

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Proof of opening to the commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$



$\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$



\mathbf{t}

$\mathbf{s}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa^2 n \log q}$

\mathbf{C}

Check whether \mathbf{s}_1 is short and

$$(\mathbf{I}_{\kappa^1} \otimes \mathbf{A}) \mathbf{s}_1 = \mathbf{f}_1$$



Prove knowledge of an opening $\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1}, (\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2})$ to the commitment $(\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n) \mathbf{G} \mathbf{s}_1$

Opening proof

Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}



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Length: $\kappa^3 n \log q$

⋮

$$\mathbf{r}_{\ell-2} = (\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_{\kappa^{\ell-2} n \log q}) \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}$$

Length: $\kappa^{\ell-1} n \log q$

$$\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1} := \mathbf{G} \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2}$$

Which \mathbf{C} to choose?

Easy, pick binary coefficients.

Opening proof

Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}



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Length: $\kappa^3 n \log q$

⋮

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$$\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1} := \mathbf{G} \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2}$$

Which \mathbf{C} to choose?

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
But what about knowledge soundness? 🤔

osxdaily.com
You will not receive phone calls, messages, or FaceTime from people on the block list.

Block Contact

[Cancel](#)

Coordinate-wise special soundness




Special soundness: given two valid transcripts (A, C, Z) and (A, C', Z') with different $C \neq C'$, one can extract w .

Coordinate-wise special soundness



(x, w)



x

A



C



Z



$C \leftarrow S^t$

Special soundness: given two valid transcripts (A, C, Z) and (A, C', Z') with different $C \neq C'$, one can extract w .

CWSS: given $t + 1$ valid transcripts $(A, C_i, Z_i)_{i \in [0, t]}$ such that


c_0									
c_1									
c_2									
\vdots									
c_t									

one can extract w .

Coordinate-wise special soundness



(x, w)



x

A



C



Z



$C \leftarrow S^t$

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C_0									
C_1									
C_2									
\vdots									
C_t									

one can extract w .

[FMN23]: CWSS
implies knowledge
soundness with error
 $t/|S|$.

Opening proof

Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}



valid opening $\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1}, (\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2})$ for the commitment $(\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n) \mathbf{G} \mathbf{s}_1 = (\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n) \mathbf{f}_1$

Proof of opening to the commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$



$\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$



\mathbf{t}

$\mathbf{s}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa^2 n \log q}$

\mathbf{C}

Check whether \mathbf{s}_1 is short and

$$(I_{\kappa^1} \otimes A) \mathbf{s}_1 = \mathbf{f}_1$$

$\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1}, (\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2})$

Opening proof


Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}



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- Take $\mathbf{C} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$.
- We prove that the three-round protocol satisfies CWSS where $\{0,1\}^{\kappa \times \kappa^2} := (\{0,1\}^\kappa)^{\kappa^2}$.
- The soundness error becomes $\frac{\kappa^2}{2^\kappa}$.
- For our general protocol, the error is $\ell \cdot \frac{\kappa^2}{2^\kappa}$.

Proof of opening to the commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$



Opening proof

Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}



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Proof of opening to the commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$



$\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$



\mathbf{t}

$\mathbf{s}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa^2 n \log q}$

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Check whether \mathbf{s}_1 is short and

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Prove knowledge of an opening $\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1}, (\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2})$ to the commitment $(\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n) \mathbf{G} \mathbf{s}_1$

Opening proof

Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}




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Communication complexity:

- $\mathcal{O}(\kappa^2 n \log q)$ elements over \mathbb{Z}_q per round
- there are $\mathcal{O}(\ell)$ rounds
- total proof size is $\mathcal{O}(\ell \kappa^2 n \log q)$ \mathbb{Z}_q -elements

Proof of opening to the commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$



Prove knowledge of an opening $\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1}, (\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2})$ to the commitment $(\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n) \mathbf{G} \mathbf{s}_1$

Opening proof

Folding property: given any matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\kappa \times \kappa^2}$ and a valid opening $\mathbf{f}_\ell, (\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1})$ for a commitment \mathbf{t}



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Communication complexity:


- $O(\kappa^2 n \log q)$ elements over \mathbb{Z}_q per round
- there are $O(\ell)$ rounds
- total proof size is $O(\ell \kappa^2 n \log q)$ \mathbb{Z}_q -elements

Recall that $L = \kappa^\ell \cdot n$.

Take $n, \kappa \in O(\lambda)$. Then $\ell = O\left(\frac{\log L}{\log \lambda}\right) = O(1) \dots$

Polylogarithmic proof size!

Proof of opening to the commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$



Prove knowledge of an opening $\mathbf{g}_{\ell-1}, (\mathbf{r}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{\ell-2})$ to the commitment $(\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{I}_n) \mathbf{G} \mathbf{s}_1$

Polynomial evaluation proof for free

TLDR; we can transform an equation

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & x & x^2 & \dots & x^{L-1} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} f_0 \\ f_1 \\ \vdots \\ f_{L-1} \end{bmatrix} = y$$

Into a tensor-type relation.

Prove knowledge of an opening to a commitment $\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{f}_1$: message \mathbf{f}_ℓ and **short** $\mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_{\ell-1}$ s.t.

$$G\mathbf{s}_{\ell-1} = \mathbf{f}_\ell$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{f}_{\ell-1} &:= G\mathbf{s}_{\ell-2} \\ (I_{\kappa^{\ell-1}} \otimes A)\mathbf{s}_{\ell-1} &= \mathbf{f}_{\ell-1} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{f}_2 &:= G\mathbf{s}_1 \\ (I_{\kappa^2} \otimes A)\mathbf{s}_2 &= \mathbf{f}_2 \end{aligned}$$

$$(I_{\kappa^1} \otimes A)\mathbf{s}_1 = \mathbf{f}_1$$

Outline

1. Notion of a polynomial commitment scheme
2. Prior constructions from lattices
3. Our contributions
- 4. Performance**
5. Quiz!!!

Concrete efficiency

We build a concretely efficient variant over polynomial rings (rather than over \mathbb{Z}_q).

- Asymptotically the proof size is $O(L^{1/3})$ ring elements.

Scheme	Proof size for $L = 2^{20}$
[FMN23] (L)	3.4MB
SLAP [AFLN24] (L)	36.5MB
Brakedown (H)	9.7MB
Ligero (H)	1004KB
FRI (H)	388KB
This work	501KB

Outline

1. Notion of a polynomial commitment scheme
2. Prior constructions from lattices
3. Our contributions
4. Performance
5. Quiz!!!

Summary

- Efficient polynomial commitments from lattices
 - Succinct proof sizes and verification
 - Under standard assumptions (+ROM)
 - Transparent setup
 - Tight security proof in ROM via CWSS
 - Quantum security

Future work:

- Space efficiency – streaming polynomial commitments?
- Concrete efficiency for the integer construction?
- Tighter quantum reduction?

<https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/281>



Thank you!

This work is supported by the RFP-013 Cryptonet network grant by Protocol Labs.